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The majority of developing countries have been forced to implement s_tructural adjustment
programs, over more than a decade, in order to deal with economic crisis. Adjustment programs
_include removal of price controls, elimination of subsidies to basic necessities, privatiz.ation of
state industries, retrenchment of state employees, and trade liberalization. Given their impact on
living standards of the majority of the populations,- these programs have often provoked social
opposition-. Thus liberal economic reform was normally introduced to reluctant Third World
government~ as one of the major conditions of _loan agreements with international financial
institutions (Jeong, 1995b). This situation puts the state in a peculiar position to negotiate.
economic pr~grams simultaneously with external forces and_ domestic interest group~.
The Rawlirigs regime in Ghana has far more effectively implemented structural adjustment
programs sp<?nsored by jntemational financial institutions than its predecessors and _other African
governments!(IMF, 1995; Kanbur, 1994). The survival of Ghana's-liberal economic reform over
more than~ decade has drawn.attention-from both policy makers and researchers. In terms of
substantive policy issues, one can see a great deal of similarities between previous economic
stabiliz.ation tneasures and the current structural adjustment program. Both or them adopted such
policy measures as the removal of state control in various_ sectors of the economy and the
redistributioµ of incomes in favor of export sectors, particularly, cocoa farmers. The difference
is that these/policies had never been pursued for longer than 3 or 4 years before Rawlings took
power in 19~2. Tough austerity measures d,esigned to achieve macroeconomic balance for a short
term caused political instability and eventually the collapse of the governments. Ghana shows an
interesting ~ontrolled experiment for the way economic performance fares with different levels
of governm~nt ability to implement economic policies.
·
This/ paper compares the Rawlings government with its predecessors in terms of state
capacity to ~eal with social opposition and its relationships to international financial institutions.
The main qdestion is in what ways the political economy of structural adjusqnent is diff~rent from
previous reform efforts. More specifically, what factors can expl~ the differences? After
examining the role of the Ghanaian state in economic development, the author will focus on issues
which conftonted both the Rawlings and previous regimes in the pursuit.of market economic
reform. Thep, the capacity of the Rawlings government to carry out reform is compared with that
of the prev,ious regimes ,in terms of managing relations with. various interest groups. It also
assesses ext~rnal
pressure for policy
changes. and the response of political elites.
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The Role o~ a State in Economic Development
i

I

The )extensive state interventionism found in much of the developing world in the 1960s
and 1970s is clearly distinct from the reduced role of a state in resource allocation since the 1980s
(Biersteker, 11990:477), The populist socialist ideology of states like Tanzania, Guinea Bissau and
Ghana in th~ 1970s conditioned·their policy cho~ces to encourage a large public sector and radical
rural refonn. In -the .stati.st approach .to developmi=:nt, government officials play an entrepreneurial
tole. Politic~s and bureaucrats use state power to acquire capital and resources. The state itself
became th'.e prime instrument of class formation, fostering the ascendancy of a
1

political-administrative class whose own interests were tied to state expansion.(Young, 1991)
In many African countries in the 1960s and the 1970s, political leaders diverted state
contracts, loans, and foreign exchange towards the expansion of parastatals as the dominant or
even the sole strategy for economic development. The stagnation experienced by many African
economies is often attributed to the reluctance of national officials to assist local capitalism, a
tendency towards urban bias, and a propensity for import-substitution industries. Thus, by~early 1980s, the state was no longer treated as the prime mover of development, but increasingly
as its main constraint (Healey, et al., 92:26). This is, in part, due to changing perceptions among
development practitioners and, in part, due to the ascendancy of neo-liberal economic thinking.
It also reflects the empirical reality of state decay in Africa, and the inability of many African
states to solve pressing economic problems.
Since the early 1980s, therefore, the major attention has been paid to the deregulation of
state controlled economy. Especially, the World Bank and the IMF began to emphasize the
significance of a private sector and the utilization of market forces (Shaw, 1993). Various
international networks were engaged in the diffusion of orthodox economic ideas. Policy oversight
was required to make sure loans are properly used to strengthen market forces. Enforcing
conditionality norms led to the decline of the statist ideologies that had prevailed throughout the
developing world in the 1970s. Therefore, the promotion of structural adjustment has encouraged
a shift from statist models of economic management to greater decentralization.
In the 1990s, given the realization that the elimination of government control over a broad
range of policy issues did not necessarily bring about economic recovery, the emphasis shifted to
a more active state role in supporting private sectors. 1 Thus Africa needs not just a less
government but a better government--a government that concentrates its efforts less on direct
economic interventions but more on enabling others to be productive.(World Bank, 1990)
Some even argue that a state needs to be strengthened before the reduction of its
functions. (Evans, 1992) Organizational foundations of the developmental state focus on the
internal cooperation and ideological cohesion of the bureaucracy. Organizationally coherent states
can build the linkages with key social actors that are required to support development projects,
while avoiding the problem of capture and rent seeking. In addition, policy design can be used to
affect the structure of coalitions and the level of political support and opposition (Berry, 1990).
The crucial questions of leadership and tactics can be asked in the context of maintaining an
integrative policy framework.
·
Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs) are often viewed as excellent examples of the
developmental state. They successfully channeled government contracts, foreign exchange, and
credit to help capable local firms. The manufacturing base of NICs was promoted by labor
intensive activities, using standard imported equipment, and was propelled by the export of cheap
consumer goods to the advanced economies (Kennedy, 1994:206). NICs experience suggests that
small scale local businesses can assist in industrialization provided small firms are supported by
a competent, disciplined government which is not hostile to private initiatives. In a competitive
environment, a state needs to act to foster market opportunities in more advanced foreign countries
(Werlin, 1991:251). Due to the ·need for private capital accumulation, the state is expected to
assume "a lending role in building human resources, administrative, and physical infrastructure
capacity, while the goods-producing and noninfrastructure service sectors are left to the flexibility
2

and incentives of private enterprise and- market discipline. 11 (World Bank, 1989: 186)
Contrary to their policy toward Asian NICs, in the 1990s, foreign donors began to stress
democratization of African states along with economic reform. The World Bank and others argue
that a liberal state is essential to privatization, decentralization of services to the local level, and
a lifting of bureaucratic controls. A competitive market economy_ can be better nurtured by a
liberal state. Only a disciplined, responsible, and responsive state openly makes decisions, and
government officials are publicly accountable for their actions. Public accountability requires a
free press to monitor government performance and publicize abuses. Decentralization.can lead to
the reinvigoration of -local governments, and the fostering of community. participation and
non-governmentai organizations (Patton, 1995; Nyang'oro, 1994).
·
The Response of the State to Economic Crisis in Ghana
Since its independence, the role of the state in Ghana has varied in accordance with
-economic ideologies and political support bases of different governments. Populist governments
were interested in investment in infrastructure and redistribution of wealth while others promoted
the role of a market mechanism. During the Nkrumah government (1957-1966), the state was
involved in various industrial projects. The National Liberation Council (NLC), -organized by
military leaders who overthrew the Nkrumah regime, and the succeeding civilian Busia regime
(1966-1972) put stress on achieving macroeconomic stability. The NLC pursued three main goals,
including the restoration of budget stability, the balancing of foreign trade, ·and the consolidation
of foreign debts. The Busia government inherited the basic economic strategy, but to stimulate
growth, the government resorted to liberalization of imports.
The following National Redemption Council. (NRC) faced such urgent economic tasks as
increases in agricultural production, promotion of export earnings, reduction in budget deficits,
and rehabilitation and expansion of the vital sectors of the economy. Establishing the proper
priorities in the provision of social services.was another important goal. 2 People's National Party
(PNP) Government of President Limann (1979-1981) was pressed to adopt IMF stabilization
measures which introduced austerity_ measures as well as increases in cocoa producer prices and
devaluation. After the failure of socialist economic policie_s for a year; the Rawlings regime,
which was formed by a military coup, has implemented economic liberalization policies since
1983. With heavy financial support of the <lorior community, the Ghanaian government has
maintained its liberal economic reform after the presidential election in 1993.
i) State Capitalism during the Nkrumah Years
As in many other instances in Africa, Ghanaian leaders inherited an authoritarian state
model from the colonial period, with a tradition of strong government control over the economy.
During the post-colonial period, Ghana pursued active investment in infrastructure and
industrialization. States normally played a key role in the process. The statist direction, often
associated with economic nationalism and socialist experimentation, resulted from interventionist
. colonial traditions, the_natiomilist elite's association of capitalism with imperialism, the weakness
of an indigenous expert advice, and the new state mangers' drive for self-aggrandizement. The
3

post-colonial state appropriated the roles of economic regulator,planner, and, to varying degrees,
entrepreneur (Gyimah-Boadi, 1993:253).
With the rising popular expectations of modern economic life,· governments have to draw
on state resources to secure political control. During the Nlaumah years, in particular, state
intervention increased with its socialist ideology and its popular political base. The Ghanaian
economy at independence in 1957 was · highly dependent upon mono-crop. production for
generating resources needed for national development. The initial economic strategy of the
Ghanaian government was based on industrialization and investment· in urban sectors. This
development strategy combined inward looking statism with populist social reform.
Nkrumah believed that Ghana was being used as a source of raw materials for capital.
investment, an exclusive market for manufactured goods. He was also convinced that
non-manufacturing dependency was the main cause of underdevelopment. The state played an
important role in decolonizing the country politically, economically, and socially. The socialist
program was seen as the only way to bring Ghana to the threshold of a modem state based on
highly organized, efficient agricultural and industrial programs.
Nlcruhmah I s ·strategy was characterized by increased. public investments in industrialization
and infrastructural development in a determined effort to restructure the economy away from
colonial legacy. Socialism led to self-sustaining industrial growth. The initial state of Ghana I s
economy was healthy, and it helped the government draw the country's accumulated reserves to
finance budget deficits resulting from development projects. However, Nkrumah's strategy was
constrained by structural problems of the monocrop economy. By 1961 the Ghanaian people had
become tired of vain statements on "paradise-benefits of industrialization" which did not show any
physical signs of progress.
The failure to generate needed funds for development led to trade imbalance and budget
account deficits from 1959-66. During this period, Ghana• s foreign exchange reserve dropped by
60 percent. It was, in part, caused by a decline in prices of cocoa in th~ world market on which
the government depended for massive borrowing to finance a growing budget deficit. Deficit
:financing, and expansionist monetary policy, and slow growth of output of basic consumer goods
compounded the difficulties inherent in excess demand inflationary pressures.
Nkrumah tried to build state capitalism to compete with foreign economic interests
operating in various sectors of the economy. To penetrate economic sectors dominated by
foreigners, the state developed mechanisms of state enterprises (Ninsen, 1989:5). In the absence
of a powerful private sector, the state had to intervene in several economic activities. The
necessary revenue to finance the industrialization and social investment programs of the
government was generated through the Cocoa Marketing Board. Thus surpluses were extracted
from peasant cash crop production by the state. The government pushed the capitalist traders out
of the market and in tum started to create a buying monopoly.
These initiatives caused problems as the world cocoa prices fell sharply within the
international market. In addition, the high investment and recurrent statal and parastatal spendings
were beginning to exert external balance and i~flationary pressures. Some regional imbalances in
economic development also emerged. The northern and upper regions and adjacent districts
remained stagnant and.peripheral to the economy (Green, 1988:8). This economic crisis in Ghana
started in the mid-1960s and was accelerated in later years.
4

ii) Stabilization versus Interventionist Economic Policies
Various Ghanaian governments since Nkrumah fluctuated uncertainly 'between liberal and
interventionist economic policies. Different types of political and economic interaction led to
diverse development strategies. On the- other hand,· any single government did not consistently
pursue one policy. The state's inability to cope with challenges from volatile international
economic environment and a weak state power base made it difficult to pursue coherent economic
policies.
_Interventionist economic policies relied on domestic price control, government regulations
on the distributive system, and administrative management of the balance of payments through
fixed exchange· rates, quantitative import restrictions,· and· administrative rationing of foreign
currency. Several Ghanaian governments, including the National Redemption Council (1972-1975)
and the early years of the Provisional National Defence Council (1982'" 1983), preferred these
policy measures for political and ideological reasons. It was appealing due to its emphasis on
artificially .low official prices and equitab_le distribution of wealth.
On· the other hand, the lack of economic predictability and calculation resulting from
distortions in the pricing and state monopolization of investment decisions impaired· the private
sector's ability. In addition, such institutional arrangements as the Cocoa Marketing Board and
systems of import licenses and foreign exchange developed -abundant opportunities for rent
seeking. Patron-client relations were used as a chief means of gaining access to scarce resources
(Stryker, 1990:24950).
Due to these limits of the administrative measures, state intervention has been frequently
followed by economic liberalization. Liberal" economic measures advocate the abolition of direct
controls of private sectors and return to market mechanisms. This approach, associated with IMF
stabilization, was applied by the National Liberation Council (1966-68), the·Limann government
(1978-79), and also· attempted briefly (but unsuccessfully) at the end. of 1971 by the Progress·
Party.
It emphasized macroeconomic stability and tried to liberalize foreign trade, deregulate
market prices, realign internal prices to those prevailing in the international economy through
devaluation of the currency and other monetary measures. While cocoa prices were raised, little
attention was paid to income distribution. The package of IMF economic policies adopted _by the
Limann government in 1979, for example, included a three hundred per cent increase in the
producer price of cocoa, a sharp reduction in government expenditure, and a substantial
devaluation of the Ghanaian currency cedi.
Stabilization measures had advantages of balance of payments support, debt relief, and
government deficit reduction. Those policies, however, failed to control inflation and brought no
improvement in export performance despite massive devaluations. These. stabilization programs
neither addressed the problem of the external environment nor dependency .structures. Besides,
inadequate attention was paid to supply bottlenecks while the devaluation itself had a negligible
effect on import and export levels (Jonah, 1989b:104). Its negative effects also include higher
prices, controlled wages and retrenchment. These led to considerable popular resistance and made
it a politically risky strategy. Since the January 1972 military coup, "no weak or elected
government could contemplate [the implementation of Stabilization measures] with
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equanimity." (Hutchful, 1989:99)
What essentially happened since the end of the Nkrumah regime was the intensification of
structural constraints of the 1950s and 1960s. Gross economic mismanagement and unfavorable
external factors combined to plunge the economy in a deeper crisis. The most unfavorable external
developments were the rise in the price of petroleum and declining cocoa export earnings. These
exerted a severe pressure on the country's balance of payments position and fueled domestic price
inflation (Jonah, 1989b:104).
iii) Constraints on State Economic Policy Making

i'

I

Ghanaian governments anxious to industrialize the economy realized the lack of :flexibility
in the economy the country inherited from the British. Persistent economic crises heightened the
insecurity and frustration of the masses. Once the masses were frustrated, they withdrew their
support for the government. The lower class has little input into decisions made at the ·national
-level. Two factors determine the economic benefits reaching the masses: the actual performance
of the economy and policies made by the political elite. Since the ,low income class forms the bulk
of the population, the legitimacy of the government rule comes from their support. The popular
support often depends on economic benefits they receive. In Ghana, the political base of most
governments was quickly eroded because the anticipated economic benefits of the people did not
materialize (Herbst, 1994: 194).
The story of Ghana from the late 1960s to 1982 is one in which political instability and the
rapid turnover of policy makers contributed to misguided economic policies, to which
governments adhered despite their realization that these policies were crippling the national
economy. The inability to change policies that were driving the economy farther and farther down
was perhaps the most striking element of Ghana's history during that period (World Bank,
1989:5). State incapacity to provide material security for the masses. weakened its political
capacity to build consensus on economic reforms.
Military coups are manifestations of a basic cleavage in Ghanaian politics, symbolized by
ideology ofKwame Nkrumah versus that of Kofi Busia. The NLC coup facilitated the transfer of
power from the CPP coalition to the "old establishment" of the old elites of chiefs, professional
men, wealthy traders, senior civil servants ·who lost political power to Nkrumah's new coalition
at independence.
The crisis of the Ghanaian state stems, to a great degree, from its inability to offer a sound
material basis for economic growth. Failure to satisfy the country's economic needs makes it
difficult for the government to justify its demand for political obligation from the population.
Withdrawal of active support for political regimes and institutions became more prevalent when
the state pursued liberal economic policies under pressure from foreign donors. Austerity measures
in the past often introduced by the demand of ihe IMF were seen as betraying popular economic
interests.
The role of the state in the economy. was constrained by several factors. •First of all, a
fiscal crisis of the state caused by budgetary deficit led to external and domestic debt which, in
tum, eroded national sovereignty and state economic policy making power. The problem was
caused by the failure of the Ghanaian state to reproduce its traditional sources of export such as
6

cocoa- and to diversify or develop new sources of surplus. The economic crisis was at its roots a
structural one, although fiscal policies and bureaucratic allocation over. time exacerbated this by
· grossly restructuring incentives away from production toward exchange and rent-generating
activities (Hutchful, 1989:97).
Second, deepening agricultural stagnation and underexploitation of industrial capacity led
.to the failure to satisfy essential consumption needs. Domestic pro4uctive sectors were organized
for satisfying the need of foreign trade but not responding to growth in domestic demand. This ·
·led to the persistence of foreign· domination in the economy despite· the growth of state ·and private
Ghanaian capitalism (Ninsen, 1989b:15, 16).
Third, frequent policy changes were made in response to opposition from key economic.
· interest groups and pressure from ·the international economy. The lack of a coherent set of
economic policies is responsible for a protracted political crisis, following the overthrow of
· .Nkrumah in 1966. Increasing loss of policy control and effectiveness resulted from state instability
and absence of popular confidence and support. Continuillg efforts to mobilize resources for
investment programs in the face of depleted reserves and the collapse of cocoa prices in the
international market led to the bankruptcy of the state. On the other hand, efforts for economic
stabilization based on austerity measures alienated broad segments of the population.
iv) New State Roles in Structural Adjustment
Structural adjustment requires changes in the role of the state (World Bank, .1989). Since
adjustment policies were adopted, the productive and distributive functions of the Ghanaian state
have been severely curtailed (Jonah, 1989a). By reducing the state's intervention in production,
the Rawlings government attempted to redirect its regulatory intervention on behalf of the private
sector. However,· Bank and Fund policy recommendations have not yet produced· a desired impact.
The reduced state role for the expansion of a market mechanism has so far failed to mobilize the·
private sector adequ,ately and has not improved state fisca1 basis since, in Ghana, like many other
parts of the developing world, there is a high degree of interdependence between the public and
private sectors.
F.conomic policies have political significance since they influence. distribution of resources
in society; Simultaneously reducing the. state's productive and regulatory roles undermined its
ability both to· influence the activities of significant economic actors in the country and to provide
essential services. Tht1s, many of the policy reforms pressed by international financial institutions
produced significant challenges to the legitimacy of the existing state. Reducing or redirecting the
state's distributive intervention in the economy prevented the Rawlings regime from effectively
mediating between conflicting factions within dvil society, especially between capital and labor.
As a matter of fact, the implementation of adjustment programs resulted in an active state role in
repressing and co-opting opponents of _neo-classic economic reform.
In the early 1990s, large aid donors and multinational financial agencies pressed the
Ghanaian government for political reform which is commensurate with economic liberalization
(Oquaye, 1995). In ~nse to the pressure; national elections were held in November.1992, and
Rawlings was able to maintain his power. The concept of a. liberal state is tied to capacity .
building, disciplined by a democratic politics, to maintain political, administrative conditions for
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private capital accumulation. According to World Bank views, such a reformed state will also
· safeguard human rights and advance development objectives articulated· on all sides. The state
needs to be transformed to a crucial agent for the birth of a viable capitalism. For this purpose,
the creation of an accountable government and a stable polity is essential.
In the views of donors, a new state-society balance of power is needed for the development
of a market economy. Heavy-handed regulation of civil society by suspicious autocrats discourages
autonomous business initiatives and provokes people to flee into the unregulated informal sector.
The appropriation of the government machinery. by the elite serves their own interests throuih the
manipulation of regulatory power over contracts, licensed monopolies, and access to foreign
exchange (Rothchild, 1995). Breakdowns in the administrative justice and political instability
foster uncertainty as to the sanctity of private property. Ghana's democratic transition over the last
•· several years reflects the new political economy theory of donors. While democracy may help
create conditions for promoting private sectors, popular participation can challenge the political
legitimacy of structural adjustment especially in the midst of a lack of improved,living standards.
The State and Interest Groups
Since liberal economic reform is often considered unavoidable, the policy reform process
has evolved into a complex bargaining strategy between the state and its international creditors,
on one level, and between the state and domestic political groups, on the other level. In
determining the distribution of costs of austerity programs to society, the state must engage in
simultaneous negotiations with international creditors and domestic political groups. Thus, the
success of liberal economic policies often depends on the government ability to deal with different
,levels of policy making problems (Toye, 1991). The state then is the critical intermediary caught
in the cross-cutting pressures exerted by domestic and foreign interests.
Creditors favor a minimum of finance in return for broad and swift adjustment efforts.
Debtor governments, by contrast, seek to maximize available finance while minimizing the
political and economic costs of implementing difficult reform measures. The program should be
negotiated that can reduce the burden of the population. At the same time, it should be able to
overcome any popular opposition to austerity programs which are essential to reduction in budget
deficits. When the state has imbalance of payments and debt problems and needs international
financial assistance, the options for the state are limited. Some suggest that authoritarian regimes
are more likely to take .drastic measures to achieve macroeconomic balance while regimes in
transition to democracy have more difficulty with reforrn.(Cornia, et al., 1992) The capacity of
the Ghanaian state to negotiate economic reform since the early 1980s can be compared with that
of previous governments.
i) Economic Policy Making before the Rawlings Government
Economic reforms cannot be considered in a political vacuum. Various Ghanaian
governments before 1982 pursued often contradictory economic policies without much
· consistency. That is related to a lack of a coherent state power structure. Populist governments
pursued low food procurement prices through subsidies, and allowed overvalued exchange rates
8

to reduce the costs of imported raw materials and consumer goods. To protect industrial output
for the domestic market, they used quotas and tariffs in trade. This was a commo11 policy practice
under the Nikrumah and Acheampong regimes in the early· 1960s and the ·niid.1970s.
: On the other hand, liberal economic reform was not successful due to ·the limits of
Ghanaian political economy. Given the lack of industrial bases for manufacturing goods, the
removal of price control does not have an immediate impact. The elimination of trade barriers is
often compensated by devaluation of currency and inflation. Difficulty in credits created a tough
business environment. The favorable treatment of prices of agricultural products did 11ot bring
expected political support from rural areas. Price increases in cocoa did not trickl.e down to wage .
farmers, while the main beneficiaries were traders. Faced with resistance, the democratically
· elected Busia and the Lemann governments vacillated between.economic concessions and political
repression (Drah, 1993).
The scope of both populist and austerity economic programs was limited, and the net effect
was long periods of political stalemate in Ghana. In the context of African.political economy, the
'government's ability to manage relations With the international donor community and national
interest groups for the .management of economic policies has b~n ,cons.trained ·in several ways.
First, internal and external political forces have impact on state policy making in particular ways
but are incapable of long term domination. The Ghanaian state became "the object of endless and
inconclusive contestation among rival political and class forces" in the past (Hutchful, 1989:127).
Organizationally coherent states are capable of building the linkages with key social.actors that
are required to support developmental projects, while avoiding the problems of capture and rent
seeking (Evans, 1992). Thu~ the failure of economic reform in Ghana before 198'.Z can be
attributed to the weak organizational foundations of the·
state related· to a lack of internal
cohesion.
.
.
Second, because of the absence of effective ideological and structural domination, any of
the contending forces could not impose a particular social project over an extended period. Interest
groups compete for scarce power resources in a society divided across economic .and ethnic lines.
However, the relative weakness of those groups implies that few restriction can be imposed on the
state's capacity to implement its policies. The larger farmers do not constitute a powerful lobby
unlike Kenya and other African countries (Mosley, et al., 1991). Communal farmers selling food
and raw materials at the home market did not benefit from currency. d.evaluation in contrast with
those who engage in export farming. On the other hand, cocoa farmers in Ghana lost out to urban
consumers and other interests under the populist regimes. Given the fact. that peasants form a weak
interest group, they often seek to exit from official marketing and engage in smuggling and
migration.
ii) Politics of Structural Adjustment
When structural adjustment is introduced, it is· normally opposed by trade unions, ·
government.employees, student groups, and some u.rban professional groups such as teachers
unions and nurses associations. Labor retrenc~ment of government employees is one of the least
popular programs. While business groups generally welcome free market reform, little support
is given to devaluation, trade liberalization or higher interest rates. The· beneficiaries of
macroeconomic balance are not ~elf-evident while a long term effect takes time. The case of
9

Ghana is different from· the experience of Nigeria where the exporters and other beneficiaries of
foreign exchange supported the negotiation of IMF stabilization measures.
In the 1980s, the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC), organized by Rawlings
after 1982 military coup, was not perceived by the Ghanaian business as a strong and unequivocal
supporter of the private sector. The revolutionary organs established by the PNDC in early 1982
subjected businessmen, amongst others, to questions, searches, and punishment. The anti-capitalist
· rhetoric in 1981 and· 1982 remains a vivid memory to the Ghanaian business class. More
importantly, however, as AGI (the Association of Ghana Industries) complained, the main concern
of the business community is that private capital has been adversely affected by some of the policy
reforms implemented under the ERP. Massive devaluation of cedi--from 2. 75 per dollar in 1983 ·
to over 390 per dollar in 1991--created a severe liquidity crisis. The problem was compounded
by high interest rates in an attempt to curb inflation. Indigenous businesses had to borrow money
at rates of over 30 per cent. For some import-substitution manufacturing firms (garments, leatherprocessing, cosmetics, plastics), the situation has become worse with the competition from
imported goods under the liberalized trade system. In addition, a bulk of inflows of foreign private
investment went into extractive industries rather than manufacturing sectors.
In order to overcome the business mistrust and to show its pro-private enterprise
credentials, the government took a tough line on wage bargaining and adopted a liberal fiscal
policy supported by :financial assistance from various donors. In addition, active consultation with
· the private sector was initiated to remove the remaining obstacles to investment. The Chairman
of the largest business group in Ghana, U.A.C. Limited, was included as a member of the
governmentis official delegation to the 1992 Consultative Group meeting in Paris (Tangri, 1992).
Overall, the government has been Willing to make compromises in dealing with the private sector.
Recently funds have been obtained to support business concerns from the World Bank.
Timber processing companies· have received a government gu,aranteed loan of over $60 million
to rehabilitate saw-milling plants and equipment, while support has also been provided for several
small and medium scale manufacturing and agro-processing enterprises. Actions to develop capital
markets were also taken, including the 1990 opening of a stock exchange. The government is
assisted by the Bank to undertake studies of the financial needs of, and the impact of trade
liberalization, on the manufacturing industry. All these policies reflect the seriousness of the
PNDC's decision to promote a more secure and friendly environment for business (World Bank,
· 1991b). In its report to the Consultative Group for Ghana, the Government stated that private
investment promotion will be accorded the highest priority (World Bank, 1991a).
In contrast with its relations with the business groups, the government was more willing
to use repressive measures in dealing with social opposition from labor. In the highly repressive
atmosphere of 1984-87, Rawlings resorted to harsh suppression of the regime's opponents to
pursue unpopular austerity programs (Adjei, 1993). In 1985, Cocobod laid off 20,000 workers,
ignoring previously negotiated collective agreements and labor laws. In .addition, the government
unilaterally canceled favorable ratio of leave allowances to labor and froze the payment of
retirement benefits in 1986. In response to increasing criticisms and protests, the PNDC use such
repressive measures as detention of critics. Special legislation imposed settlement terms and barred
any judicial challenges to the mass dismissals.
Despite the use of armed forces, Rawlings could not prevent or deter labor strikes and
10

demonstrations. In addition, Trade Union Congress (TUC) was supported by white collar
organi7.ation such as the,National Association of Teachers, the Registered Nurses's Association,
and the Civil Servants' Association. They created the Consultative National Forum of.Ghana
Labour (CNFGL), a common forum for consultations and deliberation. Through this forum,
workers' protest against the PNDC' s cancellation of leave allowances acquired a national character .
(Akwetey, 1994:89). The threat of a national strike in 1986-7, supported by trade unions of
450,000 members, eventually made the government restore the leave allowances.
In response to the PNDC's arbitrary decision making; the TUC demanded .participation
in decision making. By the late 1980s, labor gained access ·to the decision making institutions of
industrial relations with the reactivation of the tripartite fora and the creation of bilateral
consultativemachineries. However, the.access to decision makerswas not translated into improved
material conditions of workers .. By 1991, the conflict between the PNDC and TUC· has .more to
do with substantive issues of wages and living conditic;ms. The bilateral. consultative machinery
did not yield much to the TUC. Trade unions continue to use labor disputes to effectively
challenge government economic strategies.
· Transition from the PNDC military rule to the National Democratic Congress (NDC)
government after the November presidential and December parliamentary ·elections in 1992
changed the policy making environmerit of economic reform. Though Rawlings succeeded in .
. maintaining his power, his.government has faced more difficulty in using arbitrary measures to
crack down-opposition. The government's battle with university lecturers and employ~s of state
owned banks as well as Cocobod workers is a test case in understanding its ability to implement
public sector reform which was pressed by the World Bank. Under dem~cratic rule, the public
more effectively challenged the government's efforts to maintain macroeconomic balance such as
the doubling of fuel prices in 1993 and reduction in severance pay liabilities for retrenched public
sector workers. The government proposal for tax hikes in May 1995 ended up with being quickly
scrapped after it was approved by the ruling party dominated parliament. The issue united
opposition parties with trade unions and small businesses.. ·It also highlighted the divisions within
the ruling party which led to the resignation of Finance Minister Botchwey who was the main
architect of structural adjustment programs.
While. Accra is extremely keen to satisfy the demand of the donor community for
privafuation of state industries, the further retrenchment of state employees and the reduction in
the government budget deficit _cannot continue without concessions to workers in order to maintain
social stability Oeong, 1995a). The Rawlings government needs to make attempts to appease the
electorate in the NovemberJ996 presidential election. The continuation .of adjustment reform can
be influenced by the government's ability to compensate material-loss for urban middle and low
income classes whose subsistence is threatened by measures to control inflation and reduce
government budgets. If economic reform in Ghana is to proceed under democratic conditions,
distributional conflicts must be resolved. Democratization is seen by the majority of dissident
groups as an instrument for obstructing structural adjustment and· protecting ·their living
standards.(Bangura, 1992:67)
Leadership Commitment and Implementation of Reform
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The selection of particular development models and strategies is influenced by political and
economic interests and ideologies -which are represented by politicians. Reform is normally
-initiated by the state leadership under external pressure. Structural adjustment programs may be
more easily implemented when political leaders are strongly _committed to liberal economic
policies and willing to deal with popular opposition to those policies. State preference for policy
reform depends on interest in system maintenance and organizational capacity as well as a general
ideological orientation of the political leadership. (Healey, 1992:20) Successful economic policy
-makers would be able not only to understand economic issues and systematic characteristics of the
policy and but also to adapt economic objectives to the requirements of national politics (Berry,
1990:1124).
Political will and bureaucratic capability are important for properly implementing and
enforcing many, if not all, of economic adjustment measures. Leaders who fail to impose these
policies demonstrate their political weakness in forcing_ the costs of adjustment onto society
(Lehman, 1993). In addition, the failure of structural adjustment is often ascribed to administrative
-decay and poor design and sequencing of reforms (World Bank, 1994). In particular, many
economic reforms, including those aimed at expanding the role- of market forces, demand
administrative and technical capabilities that are in short supply in developing countries.
Especially, deficient are adequate education among middle and low level personnel; specialized
training for higher level and technical - staff; and information gathering, processing, and
communication capabilities.
i) Pre-PNDC Experience

I

!,

Politicians may be concerned with regime survival but have different ideological
.orientations toward liberal economic policies. The behavior of Ghanaian politicians shows a
mixture of different mind-sets and strategic notions. Some leaders such as Busia were more
oriented toward liberal economic ideas than others. Other Ghanaian leaders, especially Nkrumah,
were motivated by internalized policy making and a strong feeling of independence, and asserted
national control over economic policies and management. As politicians in the Progressive Party
government did in the early 1970s, some leaders tried to build new coalitions to carry out liberal
economic reforms. -Others prefer socialist projects which emphasize mass mobilization.
Due to weak support, most Ghanaian governments before the PNDC were reluctant to take
drastic economic measures which could hurt popular economic interests. The Progress Party
Government of Busia had won a solid majority in Parliament. The return to representative
democracy and Busia's popularity at home and abroad.allowed the government to introduce some
strict measures to save the economy. The Busia government eliminated a sizable number of civil
servants, introduced new student loan programs, refused to raise the minimum wage; and froze
the assets of the Trade Union Congress. In addition, the imposition of the National Development
-Levy was designed to shift the tax burden for rural development from farmers to workers.
Both as labor retrenchment was not h~lpful in reducing government spending and as the
cocoa prices did not respond to devaluation, the regime lost faith in stabilization. In December
of 1971~ however, Busia yielded to the IMF demands and devalued the cedi. When the
government was unable to pay for fanner's cocoa m1971, farmers quietly withdrew their support
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out of frustration. The short-lived regime of the Progress Party, led by Kofi Busia, illustrated
difficulties that democratically ·elected regimes encounter in implementing Fund stabilization
programs. Whereas the government agreed, in principle, ori stabilization measures, it refused to
·undertake any more than one nominal devaluation even though the real value of the exchange rate
dropped sharply. Stringent economic measures introduced after a dramatic fall. of the world price
of cocoa created tense conflict that led to fall of the Busia regime in January 1972. These policies
allowed the military to take advantage of the regime's slipping support.
· Despite its commitment to liberal economic reform, the government of the P~ple' s
National Party (1979-1981), led by President Limann, was surprisingly resistant to external
pressures for the implementation of stabiliz.ation measures. Even though the Limann administration increased the producer price of cocoa and the price of petroleum products, it was, on the whole,
very hesitant and skeptical about the soundness of the entire IMF package of reforms. The
president's public views on the question of IMF policies were reflected in the frequent dismissals
of pro-IMF ministers from the government.
.
Regarding devaluations, President Limann was reported to have said, "Ghana has had four
devaluations and each was followed by social explosions including executions." (Jonah, 1989b: 109)
The president believed that devaluation had failed to pass the test each time it had been tried in
the country. Since not all forms of Ghana's productive· activities were dependent on external
resources, he was highly doubtful of the relevance of devaluation to the country's economic
problems.
He also argued, "Every action must be related to the social climate... The government is
a major employer and we are dealing with human beings, we cannot simply carry out a massive
dismissal of workers. "(Jonah, 1989b: 110) Faced with the potentially negative social and political
repercussion of an IMF package, this democratically elected, government opted for caution and
procrastination in its relation with the Fund. The refusal of the government to fully comply with
Fund prescriptions was based on hard political and social facts. It was also based on the wealmess
of state institutions to administer an austerity program which would be likely to provoke a severe
social and political backlash.
Consensus on stabilization programs within the government is often weak or difficult to
maintain. During the rule of the National Liberation Council (NLC) in :the late 1960s which
adopted IMF stabilization measures, there were differences· on the· scope and extent of .
stabilization measures. The Economic Committee comprised of technocrats placed a higher
priority on the achievement of macroeconomic equilibrium-than on improvement in: income
distribution. Contrary to ·that, the Political Committee opposed the. elimination of subsidies to
agricultural production and supported import restrictions· and self-sufficiency to ease Ghana's
dependence on foreign exchange (Stryker, 1990:252). They·also supported the preservation of
some state owned enterprises.
In their discussion of economic. stabilization, the Political Committee and the Economic
Committee -differed in terms ofpolitical. interests and ideological orientation. Tiie Political
Committee was oriented to economic nationalism and wanted to preserve some aspects of
Nkrumah regime's nationalistic economic policies. The Economic Committee, which was mainly
interested in macroeconomic balance, supported rapid implementation of IMF measures and
-advocated the sales of state enterprises to foreign private groups~ The NLC' s policy making body
13

thus did not allow unimpeded implementation of Fund programs.
The experience before the Rawlings regime shows that stabilization and other reform
measures face a double challenge in democracies. They have to be economically effective and
politically feasible. A sound economic strategy addresses itself explicitly to the issue of whether
reforms will be supported as the costs set in. However, both Busia and Lemann governments
failed to persuade people to support tough economic measures as material deprivation increased ..
Appeasement is the alternative to repression or co-optation, but due to economic instability, the
state elite did not have enough resources to seek support from the most powerfully organized
interest groups.
ii) The PNDC Commitment to Structural Adjustment and Technocratic Capacity
Economic policy choices for the PNDC in the early 1980s were limited by the structural
weakness of the economy. The failure of economic policies of previous regimes caused balance
of payments and deficit problems, and it made the adoption of IMF and World Bank sponsored
structural adjustment policies inevitable. The adoption of the ERP resulted in the change in the
role of the Ghanaian state in the economy. More dependence of the Ghanaiari economy on external
economic forces was unavoidable especially after the failure of self-reliance strategies. The
leadership commitment has been one of main key factors which helped sustain liberal economic
policies. However, this should be understood in the broad context of the changing role of a state
in economic reform.
When it took over power in 1982 after overthrowing the Limann government, the PNDC's
initial priority was to disorganize and reconstitute market ·economic institutions to incorporate the
masses. Mass mobilization was used as a means to provide a credible basis for reorganization of
the economic system (Ninsin, 1990:136). However, the mass mobilization was given up soon after
the economy got worse. In the midst of economic chaos, Rawlings, who chaired the PNDC, had
no choice but to attempt to re-orient its economic policies for international assistance and regime
survival (Mikell, 1989:234-235).
The fact that the PNDC abandoned its strategy of militant mass mobilization could be seen
as· a logical imperative stemming from inherent limitations of its populist policy. The regime did
not have any social base needed to initiate economic reforms in response to internal economic and
political crisis. The adoption of structural adjustment requires the creation of political atmosphere
conducive to a proper utilization of external resources. The creation of those conditions meant
curbing the militant, anti-imperialist and democratic mass movement. Thus, in political and
economic domains, there was a move away from the rampant populist rhetoric and policies
espoused in 1982 to a realignment of institutional processes by 1984 (Hutchful, 1989).
Such policies as the elimination of most price controls in 1984-5 and the easing of
regulations on layoffs were - enthusiastically implemented by a small group of Ghanaian
technocrats. Rawlings gave professional managers and technocrats wide latitude to restore the
effectiveness of state economy and profitabµity of industries. Professionals and technocrats
running ministries were protected from outside political intervention in implementing policies
(Kraus, 1987:207).
·
Political instability generates an erratic policy making mechanism. In Ghana, since 1982,
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the trend seems to emphastze a congruence of the dominant ideological viewpoint in the
government on the one hand and the dominant ideological tendencies in the Ghanaian social
structure on the other~ Rawlings himself has acknowledged that economics cannot be divorced
from politics and that political stability is a major pillar on which every ·nation rests its economic
prosperity. The PNDC has . often been hailed as demonstrating a high level of political
commitment to adjustment policies (World Bank, 199 la). Rawlings insists that Ghana will
continue to pursue the ERP whereas he admits that Ghana's economic development should be in
accordance with the conditions of the country (Ankomah, 1991:22).
In addition to the leadership commitment, sound economi~ management reqqires the
existence of local capacity. Designing responsible m_edium-term policies is not possible without
strengthening institutional and procedural capabilities (Bangura, et al., 1992). The stress of the
administrative system in Ghana was caused by the exodus of skilled and experienced senior
administrators under previous regimes.· Due to this weakness, the ERP generated a real, quite
visible, and near constant presence of IMF and World Bank personnel, visiting missions, hired
-consultants, and seconded bureaucrats and managers. However, the fragile public administration
system of the state has been further weakened by the external intervention in policy
implementation. The handful ·of key officials with not much authority and competence have to
spend· all their time coping with short term targets and negotiating with external agencies.
Government officials were overburdened by IMF and World Bank missions and consultants
who make a number of demands for one policy analysis. There.are frequent overlaps :in the_ work
of numerous policy review, pre-appraisal, appraisal and post-appraisal missions -and consulting
firms, which, around or at the same time, visit the country before and after making lo.ans and
credits. In 1985, for example, when an education sector ·study mission from the World Bank was
in Ghana,· a Dutch consulting company came to study the Public Enterprise Sector. i\t the same
time, the Industrial Sector Review, the Public Expenditure, Industrial Rehabilitation Project
pre-appraisal missions were also .present in the country. One credit or_sector adjustment program
may take a number of missions: The educational sector adjustment, for example, has led to .about_
more than half a dozen missions for preliminary research (March 1985), education sector study
(May-June 1985), policy review (September-June 1985), pre-appraisal (January- February.1986),
appraisal (March 1986), and post-appraisal (May 1986). These do notinclude visits of government
officials to Washington for consultation or advice. The multiplicity of missions cost much -time
and money and caused strains on the government' (Jonah, 1989a: 151).
International financial institutions argue that expatriate personnel and their skills were
necessary to ensure that their funds were used wisely. They also insist that, without much of this
expatriate work, the ERP would not have progressed very far. They seem to believe that Ghana
does not have_ enough ability to absorb effectively its newly increased amounts _of external
resources (Callaghy, 1990:285). Given insufficientlocal technical specialties, the.whole recovery
effort was a high conditionality process. Constant international intervention· and supervision
It is often argued that
undermine the legitimacy of the state claim to own economic reform.
given the problems of collective action, refonn initiatives are more likely to succeed where and
when political institutions insulate politicians.and their techn<>cratic allies from particular interest
group constraints, at least in the short run (Healey, 1992:19). The consolidation of reform
involves stabilizing expectations around a new set of incentives and convincing economic agents
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that ·they cannot be reversed at the discretion · of individual decision makers. The
institutionalization of a policy making process and building of implementation capacity remain
·
·challenges to the future success of reform.
Relations with International Financial Institutions
State ability to negotiate with donors has an important impact on the degree and speed of -· ·
reform. International financial institutions are less concerned about implications of any economic
measures for change in the distribution of economic wealth (van der Geest, 1994). Multi.laterals
normally do not agree with partial economic stabifuation measures. Since negotiations with donors ·
often represent power imbalance, most poor countries either accept orthodox liberal economic
policy in return for financial assistance, or refuse to implement any kind of economic adjustment.
Economic policy of indebted countries, especially small less developed ones, is influenced
by international linkages due to the lack of technical expertise and the urgent funding need of the
national government. The World Bank argues that only a handful of African countries have a
political system that encourages sustained economic growth and the systematic implementation of
rational economic and financial management (Killick, 1993). It holds that despite the severe
external macro-economic shocks of the last 15 years, African governments have not accorded
political priority to adjusting their economic policies along rational lines. Nor have they shown
much interest in exploiting their own capacity to formulate or implement economic policies or in
improving their local analytical capacity (World Bank, 1994). Thus the lack of economic policy
making capacity leads to justification of external intervention in African economy.
Financial, political and ideological power is exercised by creditors through the constitution
of the broad rules of the game. Where private sector beneficiaries of reform are scattered or
· politically weak, as in Ghana and Bolivia, the consolidation of reform, to a great extent, depends
on outside support and pressure. In Ghana, strong support from international financial institutions
has been important to the institutionalization of market reforms (Hutchful, 1994). The IMF and
World Bank intervention dramatically changed not only the balance between political forces but
also the direction of the discourse on economic development. The alliance of domestic economic
technocrats and foreign capital pursue the subordination of labor and the application of market
principles to the utilization of resources.
i) Relations of the World Bank and the IMF to Various Governments before 1982
. Ghana's relations with the IMF and the World Bank have passed through many stages. The
relationship between various Ghanaian governments and international financial institutions ranges
from full submission of its economic making power to defiance. In contrast with an initial position
of stubborn resistance to the Fund during the Nkrumah· years, Ghana fully embraced IMF policies
and collaborated with the World Bank on almost every aspect of economic policy during the Busia
government in the early 1970s. The change in tbe attitude of Ghana toward international financial
institutions can be attributed to political and economic changes within Ghana (Jonah, 1989b: 113).
Regardless of different economic circumstances, Fund recommendations to deal with
macro economic crisis of Ghana were similar. They normally included financial disciplines such
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as balance between government revenues and expenditures, and the elimination of subsidies to
state industries. They also -emphasized reductions iri consumption dem~d, increase in cocoa
producer prices, and elimination of import licensing. Whereas the. compromise of sovereignty was
inevitable to implement those policies, debt relief was conditional on the implementation of those
Fund programs.
The Nkrumah government-had a tense relationship with international financial institutions
when the government was not willing to implement Fund and Bank recommended measures which
require the reduction, or even the total stoppage, of certain social and development programs and
the relaxation of its control over the economy. As a result, Western sources of credit were closed,
and the country's economic difficulties assumed critical dimensions. The tense relationship
between the Nkrumah regime and the Fund was the consequence of the r~gime's refusal to
compromise on what it considered to be its socialist principles and strategy of development. In the
government's view, the strategy of development, its socialism, politics and sovereignty were at
stake with the external intervention. From the viewpoint of the Fund, however, the government
had become a·big political obstacle to 'so_und' economic policies.
The Fund and Bank recommendations were fully accepted by the_ National Liberation
Council (1967-1970) and Busia's Progressive Party (1969-1972). In particular, the Progressive
Party government gave the de facto control of economic decision making power to Fund-Bank
staff. The experts and advisors sponsored by the Bank and the Fund were placed in major
·economic ministries and cabinet secretariat of the government. They took over the bureaucracy
of Ghana and "reorganize it as well as create within it what they consider to be an appropriate
structural network forimplementing their policies. "(Jonah, 1989b:102)
Problems with deficit and balance of payments produced the· dependence of the Busia
government on international financial assistance. _"The depth and duration of the economic crisis
have determined the extent of external involvement in the domestic economy. The deeper the
crisis, the easier it becomes for foreign capital to assume almost total control of the economy
through the mediation of the state. "(Ninsen, 1989:38)
After the overthrow of the Busia regime, the government-Fund relationship entered a new
phase which was characterized by temporary defiance and non co-operation. The National
Redemption Council (NRC) government was able to. get concessions on a long term debt
rescheduling after its unilateral repudiation of debt in February 1972. However, their economic
policies ran against anything the Fund and the Bank had advocated since 1986. The NRC
government's attitude is well represented in its refusal even to mention the IMF or its policy
guidelines in the debt rescheduling agreement. The uneasy relationship was aggravated by the
government's economic nationalism which resulted in taking over foreign owned enterprises. This
case shows that the influence of international financial institutions is limited when political elites
pursue radical populist economic strategies.
ii) The PNDC's Relations with the World Bank and the IMF
Ghana's recent association with the Fund entails significant changes in political and
ideological direction as well_ as in a ·development strategy. The PNDC's pursuit of capitalist
development strategies is based on alliances with the World Bank and the IMF (Panford; 1994).
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Their collaboration was possible not only because the economic crisis had reached a point at which
the need for tough measures to reverse the decline had become paramount but also the PNDC gave
up a radical populist approach.
In practice, successful collaboration between international :financial institutions and Third
World Countries needs less nationalistic leadership which is willing to take Fund/Bank advises.
The Rawlings regime easily abandoned equitable and egalitarian economic development strategies
to get foreign financial assistance (Rimmer, 1992:180). However, some PNDC members opposed
the transformation of Ghana into "a laboratory for extensive -neo-classic economic
experimentation." The implementation of adjustment programs led to dismissal of high ranking
officials who believed that the market ideologies of the ERP do not represent the economic
interests of the population. 4
On the other hand, there seem to be somewhat skeptical perceptions of the future of
Ghanaian economy even among those who accepted the ERP. While the IMF and the World Bank
extol the return to market rationality, some of Rawlings supporters insist that the ERP is a tactical
-step on the way to the "socialist revolution". The agreement with the IMF was the inevitable
"political price" to be paid for securing "as much space as possible" for the revolutio~ary
manoeuvre (Hutchful, 1989: 122).
· During the first phase of the program (1984-86), political changes in Ghana enabled the
PNDC to cooperate more closely with the IMF, to implement such policies as a major devaluation
of cedi, reduction of government expenditures, and removal of subsidies on utility services.
Substantial financial assistance from external donors was offered to support those policies (Killick,
1991). Ghana-IMF collaboration was further strengthened and carried to a higher stage when the
government launched the second stage of the Economic Recovery Program.
The relationship between the government and donors is not merely an economic one. It is
anchored, to a very large extent, in a solid political framework. Despite the official claim of
multilaterals that they are not interested in politics of the countries which they assist, Bank
officials privately acknowledge the significance of the right political environment. 5 Financial and
intellectual clouts of international financial institutions strengthened the positions of those favoring
adjustment (Herbst, 1993:36).
Policy recommendations of the Bank and the Fund are not neutral in effect and are
designed to reorient state intervention away from a socialist strategy of development. The
implementation of the orthodox adjustment program requires political protection of investors'
· capital and profits. International :financial institutions encourage a greater role of professionals and
business groups in economic policy making. Taking a tough line on wage bargaining and adopting
a liberal fiscal policy are needed to build the government's pro-private enterprise credentials.
Under the latest draft of the investment code, foreign investors would enjoy substantially better
tax allowances than Ghanaians.
The external appropriation of policy making power helped .the de-politicization of the ERP
and displacement of popular participation and mobilization by a narrowly based, bureaucratic
management. The political costs of adjustment include the erosion of national sovereignty and the
autonomy of the regime. The World Bank's impact has been the highest in small countries with
limited state capabilities such as Jamaica and Zambia. Ghana was not an exception (Kahler,
1992:98). As far as economic policies are concerned, what emerged in Accra, the capital of
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... Ghana, especially during the 1980s,· was· parallel governmeri.i ·controlled, if not ·created, by
international lender agencies. The level of influence exercised by the World Bank.on policy
process is, indeed, by all accounts very high.·This is the result, in part, of debilitation of the state
. machinery and the serious shortages of Ghanaian technical personnel.
Many of recent changes in the operations· of international financial institutions include
· closer monitoring efforts, trenching loan disbursements, and insistence on policy actions prior to
the disbursement or even negotiation of a loan, the specific delineation of loan conditions, and
introduction of ·tighter cross".'conditionality· (World Bank, 1991b). These new policies can be
interpreted as efforts to overcome strategic dilemmas in enforcing.loan conditions ..
· Tension occasionally arises due to donor pressure for making sweeping cuts in publicspending and retrenchment of state employees. 6 In its strategy paper, the Bank argues that 'donor
support for reform has made little difference' to the role of the public sector. It says that the
government's attitude toward public sector reform 'remains one of ambivalence.' In response to
the Bank verdict, the government argues that tens of thousands of public sector and· civil service
workers were laid off; 37 state-owned enterprises were liquidated;.nearly 40 public sector entiti~,
including parts of Cocobod, ·have been privatized. The government also imposed terms for the
payment related to the end of service benefits to retrenched workers._
To achieve high growth levels, the Bank sees a more drastic reduction in the size and role
of the public sector and decreases in public expenditures as essential
confirming the private
sector's leading role in the economy and for boosting the level of public savings (Kanbur, 1994). 7
· . The huge budget deficit that the government accumulated to win the 1992 elections has put the
Rawlings regime under special pressure to prove its fiscal prudence to its international backers.
The Bank and other donors temporarily withheld 170 IIiillion dollars of aid in order to control the
.government's spending.
Up to 1998, the World Bank plans ·to ·support the government's growth strategy by
providing 1,500 million dollars for 32 projects. but it warns that should the momentum for
economic reform be lost 'because ofa decline in commitment of the government, perhaps because
of political unrest or inability to reach consensus, the proposed operations program• would be cut
down to 16-18 projects and a total of 800 million for the five years 1994-1998 (Africa
Confidential, 1993:4-5). Despite these warnings, the leverage of the Bank is more limited than
during the early stage of adjustment. Given mediocre success of adjustment programs in Africa,
international ·financial institutions have a huge stake in the success of reform in Ghana.
Government failure to meet implementation schedules 6f a few projects is not likely to result in
the withdrawal of heavy investments of donors.

for

Conclusion
Theories of political economy stress an understanding of the impact of economic policies
on various groups in society as well as the impact that these groups have, -in tum, on policy
decisions. In Ghana, this .feedback mechanism failed to operate as sµccessive regimes increasingly
made decisions within a political vacuum because of their isolation from the Ghanaian populace.
Binding macroeconomic constraints"left virtually no scope for independent decisions (Stryker,
1990:248-249). The Rawlings regime could overcome these difficulties due to an enhanced flow
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of resources from international donors, an ability to handle powerful political opposition, and
internal cohesion of the leadership .
.The past experience of Ghana shows that it is more difficult to ,pursue economic
stabilization when the economy has become severely repressed and disorganized. Political risks
are always involved in undertaking a formal stabilization program based upon conditional
agreements with the IMF, and the World Bank or other sources of external finance. When an
organizational basis of state autonomy is weak, it is harder to sustain reform. In addition, state - ·
capacity is affected by the degree of bureaucratic insulation and the level of technocratic expertise.
The adoption of adjustment strategies in Ghana is not related to the emergence of dominant
ideologigu or class bases for capitalism but rather reflects the influence of international economic
forces. Liberal economic reform inevitably involves some form of austerity measures which cause
medium and short term costs. To soften hardships, an enlarged flow of international loans and
grants is necessary. Favorable terms for Africa's international debt service obligations are essential
conditions for the success of reform.
Difficulty of policy change can be measured by the capability of state elite_s to anticipate
the precise soc;ial effects of policy charige and to communicate with and persuade powerful
interests. The government should weigh up the potential benefits of alternative economic policies
(Jeong, 1996; van der Hoeven, et al., 1994). In a democratic political environment, it is a serious
question how to create social consensus. As Ghana's former Finance Minister Kwesi Botchwey
recently emphasized, the government needs to "do a better job of informing people about
structural adjustment and to demonstrate that the sacrifices required for economic recovery are
being shared equally. "(African Research Bulletin, December 16-January 15 1994:11523)
Effectiveness of adjustment policies can be influenced by the extent to which the
government should pursue free market economic reform, types of constraints economic
technocrats face, and strategies to .overcome the opposition. Rawlings has been so far more
determined and has more resources than previous leaders who attempted stabilization measures.
However, policy designs on sequencing of reforms need to be improved to protect the economic
well-being of urban middle and low income cla$ses (Akuko-Frimpong, 1994)~ Building
extraordinary administrative capacities is linked to strategic necessities of state power to strengthen
conditions for reform. For governments to reduce their role in the economy and expand the play
of market forces, the state itself may need to be strengthened.

Notes
1. Some argue that no country in Africa achieved sound macro-economic balance. Adjustment

alone cannot produce sustained growth (Rimmer, 1995; Schatz, 1994)
2. The ini.tial support for the National RedemptioQ Council which took power from Busia was

_related to reaction to the previous government's austerity economic measures. More
importantly, such programs as "Self-Reliance" and "Operation Feed Yourself'' did not bring
any immediate adverse effect on any segment of the population. However, the inflation rate
. went up to 116 percent by 1979 with shortages and higher prices for local food. The final blow
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came when the government devalued the cedi by 139 percent and lost whatever justification it
had for the 1972 coup.
The coup that toppled th~ SMC government in 1979 was precipitated by a national
uprising. Mass withdrawal of support was caused by widespread dissatisfaction with the
management of the economy which led to-frequent strikes by students, taxi drivers, nurses and
teachers. When the economic conditions began to seriously affect the life style of .the elite
group, they joined th~ popular uprising to bring the government down. ·
Consultants contracted by the Bank and Fund are paid far higher than local counterparts. In
1986-88, for example, local consultants were paid $80-20.per month, while foreign· consultants
. received between $3,000 and $5,000 a month (Economic Intelligence Vnit, 1990:16).
3•

4 • The highly secret nature of program negotiation generated the demand for public debate

even within the government. Rawlings had to repress the activities of grassroots organizations-created by leaders of his populist movements~-which were engaged in popular participation in
various sectors of the economy.
·
5. Interview with a Bank official on December 7, 1990.
6. Slippage in.the implementation of World Bank loan agreements is often evident in
institutional reform which requires change on a broad scale such as the.abolishment of the
Cocoa Board (Toye, 1992:95). This is not unique in Ghana.

7. The government's attempted to unilaterally cut the severance pay-off to the_ Cocobod
workers, from the equivalent of two years to six months pay. However, the Bank argues that
end of service benefit claims by workers have not only slowed down the pace of privatization
but also burdened public expenditure.
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